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Abstract
A negotiator’s own power and their counterpart’s emotional reaction to the negotiation both influence the outcome of negotiations. The present
research addressed the question of their relative importance. On one hand, social power should be potent regardless of the other’s emotions.
On the other hand, the counterpart’s emotional reactions inform about the ongoing state of the negotiation, and as such are more diagnostic
than the more distal power cue. In a simulated computer mediated negotiation, 248 participants assumed the role of a vendor of computerized
avionics test equipment and their objective was to negotiate the price, the warranty period, and the number of software updates that the buyer
will receive free of charge. Participants negotiated the sale after being primed with either high or low power or not primed at all (control
condition). They received information that their counterpart was either happy or angry or emotionally neutral. The findings showed that even
though power was an important factor at the start of negotiations, the informative value of emotion information took precedence over time.
This implies that emotional information may erase any advantage that counterparts have in a negotiation thanks to their higher social power.
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Social power has an important influence on how people behave (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Keltner,
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). Social power is usually defined as one's ability to influence
and control the behavior of others (French & Raven, 1959; Imai, 1993; Manz & Gioia, 1983). The social power of
negotiators affects negotiations in several ways, for one, by determining the negotiator’s aspirations, demands,
and willingness to make concessions (see e.g., De Dreu, 1995; Giebels, De Dreu, & van de Vliert, 1998) but also
by influencing the extent to which a negotiator is aware of what the counterpart’s underlying interests in the nego-
tiation are (Mannix & Neale, 1993). Yet, the effect of social power on negotiations should also vary as a function
of how the negotiation unfolds.
Next to social power, the emotions expressed during a negotiation are a potent factor for the unfolding of a nego-
tiation (see e.g., Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Steinel, van Kleef, & Harinck,
2008; van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, 2004b, 2006). Generally emotions serve a communicative function
by providing information about expressers (Hareli & Hess, 2012; Hareli & Rafaeli, 2008; Hareli, Sharabi, & Hess,
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2011; van Kleef, 2009, 2010). In the specific context of a negotiation, emotions can serve as feedback about the
negotiator's mood and their willingness to agree to proposed offers (Putnam, 1994). Indeed, every emotion carries
a specific message; for example, a positive emotion signals trust and a willingness to cooperate (Frank, 1988;
Fridlund, 1994; Knutson, 1996), whereas a negative emotion may denote an intention to compete (Allred, Mallozzi,
Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Thompson, Medvec, Seiden, & Kopelman, 2001). More specifically, the emotions of a par-
ticipant in a negotiation provide information about how far the current offer is from what the participant wants to
achieve. Thus, negotiators concedemore to angry counterparts than to neutral ones and less to happy counterparts
than to neutral ones (van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b).
One important question is how these two factors work together in affecting the negotiation. This question is important
because, as reviewed briefly above, both factors were shown to independently play an important role in negotiations.
However, given that both factors often coexist in a negotiation and that they are closely linked (Keltner et al., 2003;
Tiedens, 2000) it becomes of interest to examine how these factors interact to affect negotiations. Previous research,
acknowledging the potential link between these factors in negotiations, has shown that the extent to which nego-
tiators consider the emotions expressed by their counterpart during the negotiation depends on the decisional
power of the perceiver (van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006). Specifically, when negotiators were not
dependent on the counterpart, that is, were not obliged to reach an agreement in the negotiation, their offers were
not influenced by the counterpart’s emotions. By contrast, the counterpart’s emotions were taken into account in
situations of high dependency, either because negotiators did not have an alternative to the negotiation, or because
they are low in organizational status, that is, held a low level position in the organization (van Kleef, De Dreu,
Pietroni, et al., 2006).Yet, this raises the question of the relative importance of emotions and power for the nego-
tiation. On the one hand, social power is known to be a potent factor in negotiations, hence its impact should be
potent regardless of the emotions of a counterpart. On the other hand, emotions are more proximal signals about
the ongoing state of the negotiation, and as such can be more diagnostic in specific situations than power, which
is a more distal cue (Hareli, Sharabi, Cossette, & Hess, 2011). Thus, the question arises of how the influence of
power and emotions unfolds over the course of the negotiation and whether they interact or both independently
influence the negotiation. This was the main question addressed in this research. Based on the rationale delineated
above, we predicted that emotions, being a more proximal signal of the way the negotiation unfolds, will overpower
the importance of the negotiator's social power as this is a more distal cue and hence less predictive of what is
expected to happen at specific points in the negotiation.
We explored the extent to which negotiators’ offers in a computer-mediated negotiation were affected by their
social power and their counterpart’s emotional reactions to their offers using a paradigm adapted from van Kleef
and colleagues (see e.g., van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). Specifically, participants were to assume the role of a
vendor (i.e., a sales person) who has to negotiate with a buyer (i.e., costumer) a deal involving a computer system,
using a computer mediated communication system. They had to negotiate the price of the computer system, the
number of free software updates and the years of warranty. The “buyer,” who was actually simulated by the
computer, rejected offers that were above a pre-set acceptable offer, with a message reflecting either anger,
happiness or emotional neutrality. The negotiation task was designed such that it captured the main characteristics
of real-life negotiations in that it included multiple issues differing in utility to the negotiator, information about
one's own payoff only, and a typical offer-counteroffer sequence (see also van Kleef et al., 2004a). Computer-
mediated negotiation is a frequently used tool for negotiation and important in its own right (De Dreu & van Kleef,
2004) and research indicates that results from negotiation studies using computer mediated communication and
studies in which similar negotiations were performed in face to face communication (Kopelman et al., 2006) or by
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other means such as the simulation of negotiations over the phone (van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, et al., 2006) are
comparable. Importantly, both studies mentioned above, tested the role of emotions in negotiation and the second
one specifically tested the role of emotions and power in negotiations.
To manipulate the vendor’s power, priming was used. In previous research, power has been manipulated in
various ways, for example, by varying negotiators’ freedom to act or by giving them a specific organizational status
(van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, et al., 2006). Organizational status refers to the standing or position of a specific
individual in the organization, for example, an employee or manager. However, a person with high organizational
status has also more decisional latitude than a person with low organizational status. Yet, this larger latitude can
grant the negotiator a practical advantage in the negotiation that is not necessarily uniquely related to power.
Also, organizational status is not always equivalent to actual power and this may be of specific concern in a
country with low power distance such as Israel where hierarchies are often perceived as flat (Basabe & Ros,
2005). Previous studies testing the role of emotions and power in negotiation were conducted mainly in the
Netherlands (e.g., De Dreu & van Kleef, 2004; van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, et al., 2006) and the U.S. (e.g., Ko-
pelman et al., 2006). We therefore decided to manipulate power through priming, a procedure that has been
shown to be effective for power manipulations and that does not present the above mentioned disadvantages
(see e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; Smith & Trope, 2006).
Method
Participants
A total of 248 participants (128 men) with a mean age of 30 years (SD = 7.3, range 20-56) who were graduate
and undergraduate students from the University of Haifa participated in the study for partial course credit. They
were recruited fromMBA (188 participants) and B.A. social psychology classes and participated in the experiment
for extra course credit. Participants volunteered to participate in the experiment during class breaks. The study
was approved by the University's ethics committee.
Procedure
Participants entered the laboratory where they were told that they are going to be engaged in two separate and
unrelated studies and that for each they would get separate course credit. Participants, who signed the informed
consent form, then received randomly one out of three texts used for the power priming task developed by Galinsky,
Gruenfeld, andMagee (2003). Specifically, participants in the high social power condition were requested to describe
as detailed as possible a time when they had power over another person or persons. Participants in the low social
power condition were asked to describe a time when another person or persons had power over them. In the
control condition, participants had to describe what happened yesterday. Each participant wrote one of these
descriptions as a function of the condition he or she was assigned to. Thus, the social power of the participant
was exclusively determined on the basis of the type of situation they were asked to describe. Once they had finished
this task, participants placed the page in one of three boxes on which it was written “You having power over others,”
“Others having power over you,” or “Yesterday,” in line with the experimental condition they were assigned to.
The respective box was left in front of them during the entire study to increase the impact of the priming.
The negotiation task
The negotiation task consisted of a computer mediated negotiation paradigm adapted from van Kleef et al. (2004a,
2004b). The task was designed to capture the main characteristics of real-life negotiations as detailed above. In
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the adapted version, participants were assigned the role of a vendor of computerized avionics test equipment
(i.e., computer hardware and software designed to test aircraft electronic devices) and their objective was to ne-
gotiate the price, the warranty period, and the number of software updates that the buyer will receive free of
charge. They were told that the other negotiator is a student from a different university who studies in a similar
program. In reality the buyer was simulated by the computer program. Participants received a payoff chart (see
Table 1) that showed them which outcomes were most favorable to them and were told that their objective was
to earn as many points as possible. As shown in Table 1, higher prices, fewer updates and fewer years of warranty
yielded more points.
Table 1
Participants’ Payoff Chart – Points Earned as a Function of Choices Made by the Participant
Software updatesWarranty periodPrice of Computer system
Level PayoffNumber of UpdatesPayoffWarranty (in years)PayoffPrice ($)
24011201400150,0001
2102105350145,0002 .51
1803902300140,0003
150475250135,0004 .52
1205603200130,0005
90645150125,0006 .53
607304100120,0007
3081550115,0008 .54
09050110,0009
The participants were told that "You can observe that the best deal for you is 1-1-1, which will yield 760 points
(400 + 120 + 240)." To clarify the payoff chart, consider the following examples. A choice of 8-7-7- will yield 140
points (50 + 30 + 60), 7-6-7 yields 205 points (100 + 45 + 60) and a choice of 6-6-6 yields 285 points (150 + 45
+ 90). The corresponding payoff table for their counterpart was not shown, but participants were told that it differed
from their own.
To enhance participants’ involvement in the negotiation task, they were informed that at the end of the experiment
the points they receive would be converted into lottery tickets and that the more points they earned, the more
lottery tickets they will obtain and hence the greater their chance of winning the prize (dinner for two at a restaurant)
would be. To emphasize the mixed motive nature of the negotiation, participants were told that only those who
reached an agreement could participate in the lottery. Thus, on the one hand, there was an incentive to earn as
many points as possible, whereas on the other hand, there was an incentive to reach an agreement.
After a short pause during which the computer supposedly assigned buyer and vendor roles to the participants,
all participants were assigned the role of vendor. They were told that the buyer (i.e., their counterpart) would make
the first offer and that the negotiation would continue until an agreement was reached or until time ran out. Just
before the negotiation started, participants were told that an additional goal of the study was to examine the effects
of having versus not having information about the counterpart’s intentions. They read that they had been randomly
assigned to receive information about the intentions of their counterpart without the counterpart knowing this; and
that the counterpart would not conversely receive information about their intentions.
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Following these instructions, the negotiation started and the buyer (i.e., the computer) made a first offer. During
the course of the negotiation, the buyer accepted higher prices and less service. Conditions set by the participants
were accepted if they equaled or exceeded the offer the computer was scheduled to accept in the next round. If
no agreement was reached after the sixth and last round, the negotiation was terminated (for the rationale of this
choice, see van Kleef et al. (2004a). Thus, the maximum number of rounds was six.
Emotion manipulation
After the first, third, and fifth negotiation round, participants received information about “the intentions of the buyer,”
which included information about the buyer’s emotion. Figure 1 describes the task and its various stages.
Figure 1. Graphic description of the negotiation task.
Participants had to wait for about a minute and a half while the buyer was supposedly asked to reveal what he or
she intended to do in the next round, and why. Participants then received the written answer in a separate box
on the screen. The answers consisted of the buyer’s intentions for the next round as well as of an emotional verbal
statement, for example, “This offer makes me really angry,” that comprised the experimental manipulation. It was
stressed that the buyer did not know that his or her “intentions” were revealed to the participant. This was done
in order to lead participants to believe that they received information about the real emotions of the counterpart,
and not strategically faked, inhibited, or exaggerated emotions. The emotional statement was either angry, happy,
or neutral (see Table 2).
As shown in Table 2, the emotional verbal statements representing each emotional reaction were somewhat
varied across the rounds in which this information was provided to increase the impression that these were actual
written responses of the counterpart. Thus, as Figure 1 shows, for up to 6 rounds, as long as the buyer does not
accept the vendor's offer, the negotiation continues and the vendor receives the buyer's emotional reaction to
his/her previous offer. If the buyer accepts an offer, the negotiation ends.
To sum, our experimental manipulation resulted in a 3 (social power: high vs. low vs. not defined) x 3 (emotional
response of the buyer: anger vs. happiness vs. emotional neutrality) between- subjects design.
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Table 2
Statements Used for the Manipulation of the Counterpart's Experienced Emotion
StatementCounterpart's emotion
After Round 1
This offer makes me really angry, I think I will offer 8-7-7.Anger
I am happy with this offer, I think I will offer 8-7-7.Happiness
I think I will offer 8-7-7.No emotion
After Round 3
This is really getting on my nerves. I am going to offer 7-6-7.Anger
This is going pretty well so far. I am going to offer 7-6-7.Happiness
I am going to offer 7-6-7.No emotion
After Round 5
I am going to offer 6-6-6, because this negotiation pisses me off.Anger
I am going to offer 6-6-6, because I feel good about this negotiation.Happiness
I am going to offer 6-6-6.No emotion
Note. Statements have been translated from Hebrew.
Results
Participants’ negotiation results for price, warranty and updates were converted into points based on Table 1. The
following analyses were conducted on the total number of points obtained at each round of the negotiation.
To assess the effect of the negotiation partners' emotion expression and participant's social power on the negotiation
results, a 3 (emotion: neutral, happy, anger) x 3 (priming: no status priming, high status priming, low status priming)
x 6 (negotiation round) a mixed factors ANOVA was conducted on the total number of points obtained at each of
the six negotiation rounds. Simple effect analyses (Fisher LSD, p <. 05) were used to follow-up on these effects.
A significant main effect of negotiation round emerged, F(2, 421)i = 219.4, p < .0001, such that over the course
of the negotiation participants compromised by asking for a lower price, and granting more updates and longer
warranties. In addition, a significant main effect of emotion expression emerged, F(4, 421) = 4.80, p < .01, which
was qualified by an emotion expression x negotiation round interaction, F(4, 421) = 4.75, p < .01. Specifically, at
the first negotiation round (before the first emotion feedback was given) no significant differences between the
emotion conditions emerged.
As shown in Figure 2, a significant difference between happiness and neutral emotion information emerged from
round two to six, such that participants compromised less when their counterpart showed happiness rather than
emotional neutrality. From round four onward, happiness was also significantly different from anger such that
participants also compromised less when their counterpart expressed anger rather than happiness. No difference
between anger and neutrality emerged.
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Figure 2. The effect of counterpart’s emotion on participants offer over the course of negotiation terms.
That is, as soon as emotion feedback was provided, participants whose negotiation partner expressed happiness
tended to compromise less and this effect became increasingly stronger over the course of the negotiation. Thus,
a counterpart's emotion message had an effect on the subsequent offers of the participant.
Further, a significant status x negotiation round interaction emerged, F(4, 421) = 2.60, p = .042 (see Figure 3).
Simple effects analyses revealed, as expected, that in the beginning of the negotiation (rounds one to three) ne-
gotiators primed with high power compromised less than those primed with low power. However, from round four
to the end of the negotiation, social power made no difference anymore as participants in all three social power
conditions made comparable offers. This shows that participants' primed social power influenced the offers they
made during the negotiation. In sum, whereas the emotions of the counterpart had an increasingly stronger effect
as the negotiation proceeded, the effect of social power waned.
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Figure 3. The effect of negotiator’s social power participant’s offer over the course of negotiation terms.
Discussion
The goal of the present study was to assess the impact of the participant's social power and the emotional reactions
of their counterpart to the participants' offers on the outcome of a negotiation. Previous research on negotiations
already alluded to the importance of negotiators' social power (Kopelman et al., 2006) and even to the interaction
between emotion information and power (van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, et al., 2006).
However, this latter study operationalized power in terms of decisional power. Specifically, the high power indi-
vidual not only had more power but actually additional means to reach their goal in the negotiation, that is, they
had a practical advantage over the low power individual.
By contrast we manipulated only the social power of the negotiator without affecting their options in the negotiation.
In such a situation we predicted that social power on its own will have a lesser effect on the negotiation relative
to the emotional reaction of a counterpart to the negotiation. This, since such emotions serve as a more proximal
cue of the way the negotiation unfolds.
As expected, following the logic of the negotiation process, negotiators compromised over the rounds of the ne-
gotiation by asking for a lower price, and granting more updates and longer warranties. This effect was qualified
by the counterpart’s emotion during the negotiation. Specifically, we replicated van Kleef et al.’s (2004a, 2004b)
finding that negotiators whose counterpart expressed happiness with the negotiation compromised less than those
whose counterpart expressed anger. However, in this study, the same effect as for anger was found for neutral
expressions as well.
This latter finding of congruent effects of expressed anger and neutrality replicates previous findings (Hareli,
Shomrat, & Hess, 2009) and may reflect a cultural difference in reactions to emotions. Alternatively, people who
express neutrality when an emotional reaction might be expected can be perceived as more negative (Hess,
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Adams, & Kleck, 2007). Due to this fact, it is possible that in the present context, the two reactions conveyed a
similar message regarding the counterpart’s intentions in the negotiation.
Importantly, social power had a significant effect on the offers made by the participant such that the high power
participant compromised less than the low power one. However, in line with our predictions, this was the case
only at the beginning of the negotiation. The social power of the negotiator lost its effect on the participants’ offers
as the negotiation progressed. Thus, over all, when considering the combined effect of the negotiator’s social
power and the emotions of their counterpart, social power played a role mainly early in the process. By contrast,
the role of emotions becomes stronger as the negotiation moves on and agreement is not reached.
This indicates that the tracking role of emotions in negotiations (van Kleef et al., 2004a) becomes a more potent
factor in the negotiation as it progresses. This, because emotions provide a more proximal and reliable indicator
of where the negotiation stands vis-à-vis one’s counterpart. By contrast, social power, which is a more distal factor,
determines the starting point of the negotiation and becomes less and less relevant when the emotions provide
on-going feedback about how the negotiation progresses. This finding shows that a negotiator’s social power
when determined by his general standing does not determine whether the emotions of the counterpart are relevant
or not. Yet, when a negotiator’s social power provides him or her, a practical advantage in the negotiation as, for
example, in van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, et al. (2006) it has an effect across the negotiation. Rather as long as
the negotiator has an interest in successfully concluding the negotiation (which was not the case in the study ref-
erenced above, where power was operationalized as decisional freedom), the emotions of the counterpart, regard-
less of social power, not only remain pertinent but gain increasing importance as the negotiation progresses. This
further shows the power of emotions in negotiations.
Specifically, previous research showed that the social power of negotiators affects negotiations in several ways,
among other things, by determining the negotiator’s aspirations, demands, willingness to make concessions, and
actual gains (see e.g., De Dreu, 1995; Giebels et al., 1998) as well as the extent to which a negotiator is aware
of what the counterpart’s underlying interests in the negotiation are (Mannix & Neale, 1993). Yet, as the present
research shows, this effect may be restricted to early stages of a negotiation and/or to situations in which social
power is directly linked to decisional freedom in the negotiation. However, when the social power of the negotiator
does not impinge on decisional freedom, its effect seems to diminish in the face of more proximal and hence more
diagnostic information about the situation such as that provided by the emotions of the counterpart.
Despite the fact that we were able to show the combined effect of social power and emotions on negotiations,
our research also suffers from some limitations. First, we employed a computer mediated negotiation. Even though
there is good evidence that the results of studies using this type of negotiation match results of studies using face
to face negotiations (e.g., Kopelman et al., 2006) or other paradigms of simulating negotiations (e.g., van Kleef,
De Dreu, Pietroni, et al., 2006) we cannot preclude the possibility that at least partly our findings are limited to
this type of negotiation. This may be especially the case since negotiators do not see one another and hence
social power may have less of an importance in this case. Further, our study was conducted in a culture known
to be low on power distance (Basabe & Ros, 2005). It may be the case that in a different culture in which power
distance is higher social power is a more potent factor in negotiations across the entire process. Future research
needs to address these possibilities.
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Overall, the present study demonstrated that even though power is an important factor at the start of negotiations,
the informative value of emotion information takes precedence over time and emotion information, as a more
proximal cue to the other person’s intentions, becomes more diagnostic than perceptions of one’s own power.
Notes
i) To account for lack of sphericity, degrees of freedom were Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted. Reported degrees of freedom
were rounded to the next integer.
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